feat: update gitea vendor
runner nix smoke / nix label and flake smoke (push) Failing after 1m28s

This commit is contained in:
2026-09-26 21:18:24 +00:00
parent c439c1b948
commit d9b2a4e787
3538 changed files with 116131 additions and 44340 deletions
+91 -65
View File
@@ -15,20 +15,22 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
auth_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/container"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/httplib"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/log"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/optional"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/session"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/setting"
source_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/auth/source"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/auth/source/oauth2"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/externalaccount"
user_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/user"
"gitea.dev/models/auth"
user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
auth_module "gitea.dev/modules/auth"
"gitea.dev/modules/container"
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
"gitea.dev/modules/httplib"
"gitea.dev/modules/log"
"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
"gitea.dev/modules/session"
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
source_service "gitea.dev/services/auth/source"
"gitea.dev/services/auth/source/oauth2"
"gitea.dev/services/context"
"gitea.dev/services/externalaccount"
user_service "gitea.dev/services/user"
"github.com/markbates/goth"
"github.com/markbates/goth/gothic"
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ func SignInOAuthCallback(ctx *context.Context) {
}
}
sort.Strings(errorKeyValues)
ctx.Flash.Error(strings.Join(errorKeyValues, "<br>"), true)
ctx.Flash.Error(strings.Join(errorKeyValues, "\n"), true)
}
// first look if the provider is still active
@@ -188,10 +190,6 @@ func SignInOAuthCallback(ctx *context.Context) {
source := authSource.Cfg.(*oauth2.Source)
isAdmin, isRestricted := getUserAdminAndRestrictedFromGroupClaims(source, &gothUser)
u.IsAdmin = isAdmin.ValueOrDefault(user_service.UpdateOptionField[bool]{FieldValue: false}).FieldValue
u.IsRestricted = isRestricted.ValueOrDefault(setting.Service.DefaultUserIsRestricted)
linkAccountData := &LinkAccountData{authSource.ID, gothUser}
if setting.OAuth2Client.AccountLinking == setting.OAuth2AccountLinkingDisabled {
linkAccountData = nil
@@ -289,9 +287,7 @@ func oauth2GetLinkAccountData(ctx *context.Context) *LinkAccountData {
}
func Oauth2SetLinkAccountData(ctx *context.Context, linkAccountData LinkAccountData) error {
return updateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
"linkAccountData": linkAccountData,
})
return ctx.Session.Set("linkAccountData", linkAccountData)
}
func showLinkingLogin(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, gothUser goth.User) {
@@ -302,7 +298,23 @@ func showLinkingLogin(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, gothUser goth.Us
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/link_account")
}
var oauth2AvatarHTTPClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
// oauth2AvatarAllowList parses the host allow-list applied to avatar fetches from the global
// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST, defaulting an empty setting to the built-in "external" set. An empty
// host-match list would otherwise disable the allow-list check entirely and permit any host, including
// loopback/private addresses (SSRF).
func oauth2AvatarAllowList() *hostmatcher.HostMatchList {
return hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
}
// oauth2AvatarHTTPClient builds the SSRF-protected client for avatar fetches. It is constructed per call
// so a changed allowlist takes effect (avatar fetches are infrequent, so this is not a hot path).
func oauth2AvatarHTTPClient() *http.Client {
allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("oauth2-avatar", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
}
}
func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, avatarURL string, u *user_model.User) {
if !setting.OAuth2Client.UpdateAvatar || len(avatarURL) == 0 {
@@ -316,7 +328,7 @@ func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, avatarURL string, u *user_mo
// Some hosts (e.g. Wikimedia) reject Go's default User-Agent.
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Gitea "+setting.AppVer)
resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient.Do(req)
resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Do(req)
if err != nil {
log.Warn("fetch %q failed: %v", avatarURL, err)
return
@@ -349,12 +361,11 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
needs2FA := false
if !authSource.TwoFactorShouldSkip() {
_, err := auth.GetTwoFactorByUID(ctx, u.ID)
if err != nil && !auth.IsErrTwoFactorNotEnrolled(err) {
var err error
if needs2FA, err = auth.HasTwoFactorOrWebAuthn(ctx, u.ID); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
needs2FA = err == nil
}
oauth2Source := authSource.Cfg.(*oauth2.Source)
@@ -368,14 +379,26 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
opts := &user_service.UpdateOptions{}
// Reactivate user if they are deactivated
// HINT: OAUTH-AUTO-SYNC-USER-ACTIVATION: see services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go
// Reactivate user only if they were disabled by the OAuth2 auto sync cron (invalid_grant),
// which clears AccessToken/RefreshToken/ExpiresAt on the ExternalLoginUser row
// An admin-disabled user has no such signature, so we leave IsActive alone
// and let verifyAuthWithOptions route them through the prohibit-login / activate page.
if !u.IsActive {
opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)
extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err)
return
}
// the cron clears all three token fields when it disables a user, so require the
// full signature; a RefreshToken alone is empty for many normal logins (e.g. GitHub
// or OIDC without offline_access), which would otherwise reactivate admin-disabled users
isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.AccessToken == "" && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" && extLogin.ExpiresAt.IsZero()
if isDisabledByAutoSync {
opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)
}
}
// Update GroupClaims
opts.IsAdmin, opts.IsRestricted = getUserAdminAndRestrictedFromGroupClaims(oauth2Source, &gothUser)
if oauth2Source.GroupTeamMap != "" || oauth2Source.GroupTeamMapRemoval {
if err := source_service.SyncGroupsToTeams(ctx, u, groups, groupTeamMapping, oauth2Source.GroupTeamMapRemoval); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("SyncGroupsToTeams", err)
@@ -404,10 +427,11 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
return
}
if err := updateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
if err := regenerateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
session.KeyUID: u.ID,
session.KeyUname: u.Name,
session.KeyUserHasTwoFactorAuth: userHasTwoFactorAuth,
session.KeySignInMethod: session.SignInMethodOAuth2,
}); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("updateSession", err)
return
@@ -429,23 +453,7 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
}
}
if err := updateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
// User needs to use 2FA, save data and redirect to 2FA page.
"twofaUid": u.ID,
"twofaRemember": false,
}); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("updateSession", err)
return
}
// If WebAuthn is enrolled -> Redirect to WebAuthn instead
regs, err := auth.GetWebAuthnCredentialsByUID(ctx, u.ID)
if err == nil && len(regs) > 0 {
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/webauthn")
return
}
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/two_factor")
handleTwoFactorRequired(ctx, u, false, map[string]any{session.KeySignInMethod: session.SignInMethodOAuth2})
}
// OAuth2UserLoginCallback attempts to handle the callback from the OAuth2 provider and if successful
@@ -498,13 +506,7 @@ func oAuth2UserLoginCallback(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, requ
}
}
user := &user_model.User{
LoginName: gothUser.UserID,
LoginType: auth.OAuth2,
LoginSource: authSource.ID,
}
hasUser, err := user_model.GetIndividualUser(ctx, user)
user, hasUser, err := user_model.GetIndividualUserByLoginSource(ctx, auth.OAuth2, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
@@ -514,17 +516,33 @@ func oAuth2UserLoginCallback(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, requ
}
// search in external linked users
externalLoginUser := &user_model.ExternalLoginUser{
ExternalID: gothUser.UserID,
LoginSourceID: authSource.ID,
}
hasUser, err = user_model.GetExternalLogin(request.Context(), externalLoginUser)
externalLoginUser, hasUser, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
if hasUser {
user, err = user_model.GetUserByID(request.Context(), externalLoginUser.UserID)
return user, gothUser, err
user, err = user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, externalLoginUser.UserID)
if err != nil && !user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
if err == nil && user.IsIndividual() {
return user, gothUser, nil
}
// The external login record is stale: the linked user no longer exists, or it exists but is
// not an individual user (only individual users can sign in, so a link pointing at an
// organization, bot or remote user can never resolve). Remove it so the next sign-in can
// relink the external account to the correct user. Nothing is lost, because the link is
// recreated automatically on the next sign-in.
reason := "linked user does not exist"
if err == nil {
reason = fmt.Sprintf("linked user type is %d", user.Type)
}
log.Warn("Ignoring stale external login link [external-id=%s login-source-id=%d user-id=%d]: %s", externalLoginUser.ExternalID, externalLoginUser.LoginSourceID, externalLoginUser.UserID, reason)
if err := user_model.RemoveExternalLoginByExternalID(ctx, externalLoginUser.LoginSourceID, externalLoginUser.ExternalID); err != nil {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
}
// no user found to login
@@ -561,7 +579,15 @@ func buildOIDCEndSessionURL(ctx *context.Context, doer *user_model.User) string
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-rpinitiated-1_0.html#RPLogout
params := endSessionURL.Query()
params.Set("client_id", oauth2Cfg.ClientID)
params.Set("post_logout_redirect_uri", httplib.GuessCurrentAppURL(ctx))
// AWS Cognito uses "logout_uri" instead of the standard "post_logout_redirect_uri"
redirectURI := httplib.GuessCurrentAppURL(ctx)
if oauth2Cfg.Provider == oauth2.ProviderNameAwsCognito {
params.Set("logout_uri", redirectURI)
} else {
params.Set("post_logout_redirect_uri", redirectURI)
}
endSessionURL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
return endSessionURL.String()
}